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LAWYER-MADE LAW, LEX JURIS AND
CONFUSING THE MESSAGE WITH THE
MESSENGER
A COMMENT ON FRANKEL
BRUCE A. MARKELL*
In The Law of Cross-Border Securitization: Lex Juris, Professor
Frankel asserts that lawyers are central to the making of the laws, or
“law-like” rules, that govern cross-border securitizations.1 She lauds
this development and hints that it might provide a useful model for
other laws in a global context.  I disagree.  I think that lawyers and
their work product, while important, are just agents in the system; or
to put it another way, at best lawyers are no more than highly-trained
facilitators of securitization.  They are not, and likely cannot be, enti-
ties who make “law” in any consistent way or in any common sense
meaning of the word.  Put another way, a good lawyer ensures that
the parties’ expectations conform to what the law provides or allows;
he or she does not change the law or write new laws to satisfy those
expectations.2
I wish to make three short points in this comment.  First, I want
to sketch further my argument that lawyers do not make law or law-
like rules.  Second, I want to question an implicit assumption in Pro-
fessor Frankel’s article that lawyers are the primary agents for stan-
dardization and efficiency in securitization.  Finally, I want to raise
some questions about democracy and governance, if lex Juris is in-
deed a part of the “law.”
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* Doris S. and Theodore B. Lee Professor of Law, University of Nevada Las Vegas; Of
Counsel to the Los Angeles law firm of Stutman, Triester & Glatt.
1. Tamar Frankel, The Law of Cross-Border Securitization: Lex Juris, 12 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT’L L. 475, 480 (2002).
2. I have set out my views on the proper role of lawyers.  See generally Bruce A. Markell,
Digital Demons and Lost Lawyers, 48 FED. COMM. L.J. 545 (1996) (reviewing ETHAN KATSH,
LAW IN A DIGITAL WORLD (1995)).
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I.  IS WHAT LAWYERS DO THE “LAW”?
Professor Frankel identifies lex Juris as a possible “forerunner of
a new type of lawmaking regulating global activities: law-like rules
that escape tight control of domestic laws, but take them into account;
rules that are highly flexible for a fast-changing environment, but
quickly unified into standards and guidelines of sufficient predictabil-
ity.”3  In short, she sees lawyers as bringing order out of potential
chaos and being positive instruments of change by reducing variabil-
ity of results through consistent and adroit drafting and planning.
I might agree with Professor Frankel’s conclusion that lawyers
are such a positive force without accepting the notion that what they
do constitutes rulemaking or the creation of  “law-like” rules.  My
first point of departure, then, is in the definition of what we call
“law,” and derivatively what it means to be “law-like.”  In the quota-
tion above, Professor Frankel uses “law” in an expansive and some-
what loose manner.  As she elaborates, the opinions of legal scholars
“have a respectable place as part of the law of the land.”4  Included
within this place are the “legal documents that lawyers draft.”5  I dis-
agree with this breadth; it represents a conflation between law and
the texts that influence the shape of the law.  While legislators and
judges may consider academic writing in formulating policy or decid-
ing issues, such consideration certainly is not compulsory.  Similarly,
while contracts set the “law of the parties,” contractual freedom is
limited by notions of public policy.6
Another way to express this point of difference is to ask what
special consequences flow from labeling something as “law” or “law-
like.”  One consequence is that a state legitimately may impose a
sanction on anyone who acts contrary to the precepts or dictates of
3. Frankel, supra note 1, at 477.
4. Id. at 481–82.
5. Id. at 482.
6. Although freedom of contract is a norm of most modern legal systems, the parties’
ability to create effective and enforceable documents is limited by notions of public policy.  See,
e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 110 (1981) (setting forth grounds upon which
public policy may prevent enforcement of otherwise valid contracts); U.C.C. § 2-302 (2001) (al-
lowing courts to refuse to enforce unconscionable contracts); U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(1) (2001) (stat-
ing that “this article applies to: [¶] (1) a transaction, regardless of its form, that creates a security
interest in personal property or fixtures by contract . . .”) (emphasis added); U.C.C. § 2-401
(2001) (“Any retention or reservation by the seller of the title (property) in goods shipped or
delivered to the buyer is limited in effect to a reservation of a security interest.”); U.C.C § 1-
201(37) (2001).
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the “something” we are calling law.7  Another consequence of calling
a particular text or activity law is that, at least under something like
social contract theory or communitarian theory, the person subject to
the law will have agreed to comply with it, or at least will have agreed
to the process by which the law came about.8  Thus, it is difficult for
me to accept lawyers’ work product as “law” or “law-like,” because I
would feel perfectly free to act contrary to a contract to which I am a
stranger and would find it surprising to be held to that law simply on
the basis of knowledge of its existence.9
The practical effect of this difference in categorization already
has surfaced in American securitizations.  In the LTV Steel case,10 for
example, LTV had securitized both its accounts and its inventory and
had sold them to a special purpose vehicle (SPV), which was a sub-
sidiary of LTV.  This SPV subsidiary then borrowed $270,000,000
from Abbey National Bank, a bank based in the United Kingdom,
and gave the newly-acquired receivables as collateral.  Under the
documents as drafted, LTV sold absolutely its present and future re-
ceivables to the SPV.  Under the documents, then, LTV had no resid-
ual interest in them other than through whatever residual interest its
subsidiary held.
When LTV filed for bankruptcy, however, it took the position
that bankruptcy law gave it the status of a representative of the bank-
ruptcy estate,11 and in the name of the estate, it sought to act contrary
to the very documents it had signed.12  Procedurally, LTV made this
assertion in a motion for the right to use cash collateral under the
7. See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM 3 (1970); HANS KELSEN,
THE PURE THEORY OF LAW 33 (Max Knight trans., Univ. of California Press 1967) (2d rev. ed.
1960); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 20–25 (4th rev. ed. 1972).
8. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 190–216 (1986); see also HART, supra
note 7, at 92–96.
9. Apparently, however, this may not be so strange to Professor Frankel.  While she ac-
knowledges that private contracts cannot bind non-parties, she creates an exception for “credi-
tors . . . deemed to have agreed to the transfer by notice of the transfers . . . . [In] the United
States, if the parties follow certain procedures, such as perfection, the agreements are implicit.”
Frankel, supra note 1, at 488.  I think most lawyers who practice under Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code would find it odd to cast the structure of Article 9 in a consent (or more accu-
rately, an estoppel) mode, instead of the more regularly accepted property mode.
10. In re LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R. 278, 286 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001).
11. Under United States bankruptcy law, an estate is created by the filing of a bankruptcy
case consisting of all of the debtor’s interest in property, whether those interests are legal, equi-
table or contractual.  11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1993).
12. As a debtor in possession under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, LTV was a representative
of its bankruptcy estate.  11 U.S.C. §§ 1107, 1108 (1993).
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U.S. Bankruptcy Code.13  LTV’s contention was that, despite the
documentation drafted by its lawyers and Abbey’s lawyers, LTV still
held residual ownership of the securitized assets themselves, and that
instead of the SPV being the owner of those assets, LTV was.  Since
the amount of Abbey’s true interest—its loan amount to the SPV (or,
as LTV saw it, Abbey’s loan to LTV)—was significantly less than the
amount of assets involved, LTV sought permission to use those assets
contrary to Abbey’s wishes.14
Ultimately, LTV settled.  Abbey was paid its due through a
debtor in possession financing.15  This scenario illustrates my basic no-
tion of how laws function in a legal system: they enable one party to
use the force of the state to compel actions contrary to the express
wishes of another party.  Here, LTV was able to use the law of dis-
guised security interests to force Abbey National Bank to participate
in its bankruptcy case.  Had the documents drafted by the lawyers
been considered the “law,” or even the law between the parties, then
the matter should have ended with a detailed reading of the docu-
ments.  It did not.  The documents were read against the received
background of commercial financing, and the rights that such back-
ground gives to non-parties to the transaction.
The existence and recognition of third-party rights generally un-
dercuts Professor Frankel’s position.  Professor Frankel seemingly
acknowledges as much when she says, “Nonetheless, because third
parties can resort to domestic courts and domestic laws, lex Juris does
not afford full protection for the parties to these agreements.”16  Yet,
earlier in her article, Professor Frankel apparently thinks there is
some benefit; she writes that lex Juris “affects, though does not de-
termine, the rights of outside third parties.”17  In light of my com-
ments about third-party rights, I disagree.
The “law,” or at least the law as developed by courts and legisla-
tors, always has been deeply concerned with the effect of transactions
on third parties.  Roman law acknowledged something akin to the
13. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c) (1993).
14. The bankruptcy court found that there was a 39% equity cushion providing adequate
protection to Abbey.  In re LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R. at 286.
15. In re LTV Steel Co., Case No. 00-43866, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 635, *12 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio, Mar. 20, 2001) (discussing  the results of LTV Steel Co.’s reorganization in bankruptcy,
including its post-petition financing).
16. Frankel, supra note 1, at 488.
17. Id. at 487.
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fraudulent transfer long before Twyne’s Case.18  Additionally, both
modern fraudulent transfer law19 and modern bankruptcy law20 are
replete with provisions that enable a neutral third party, such as an
insolvency administrator, to revise or to avoid transactions that harm
creditors.
The reason for these powers are simple: a debtor’s transactions
affect more than just the parties in privity.  Furthermore, the debtor,
especially if insolvent, often does not have sufficient incentive to look
out for all of those interests.  Unless these interests are forced to the
parties’ attention through the clumsy device of potential future
avoidance, third parties stand to lose, and lose big.  This situation may
not be good for the polity.
As indicated above, Professor Frankel concedes that “lex Juris
does not afford full protection[,]”21 because of the existence of such
third party rights.  This statement is also puzzling.  If Professor
Frankel’s point is that freedom of contract in cross-border securitiza-
tion leads to standardized forms and efficiency, then that is one thing
upon which we probably can agree.  But to make that point, one need
not elevate lawyers’ work product to the status of law.  Lawyers may
devise the structures, but the structures are useless unless they
achieve the client’s goals.  The literature of path dependence and in-
novation are sufficient standing alone, without introducing further ac-
tors.
18. Roman law had recognized as a nominate tort an action fraus creditiorum similar in
purpose and effect to the modern intentional fraudulent conveyance.  See 1 GARRARD GLENN,
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES § 60 (rev. ed. 1940); Max Radin, Fraudulent
Conveyances in California and the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 27 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 1–
2 nn.1, 2 (1938); Max Radin, Fraudulent Conveyances at Roman Law, 18 VA. L. REV. 109
(1931).
Twyne’s Case, 3 Co. Rep. 80b, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Ch. 1601), is thought to be one of the
first reported cases implementing the 1571 enactment of the Statue of Elizabeth, 13 Eliz., ch. 5
(1571) (Eng.), repealed by Law of Property Act, 15 Geo. 5, c. 20, § 172 (1925) (Eng.), but Man-
nocke’s Case, 3 Dyer 295b, 73 Eng. Rep. 661 (Q.B. 1571) (Eng.), is actually earlier.
19. See UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT, 7A U.L.A. 266 §§7, 8, at 339–59, Part II
(1999 & Supp. 2000).  This Act has been adopted in 39 states.
20. The fraudulent transfer provision of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code is found in Section 548
of the Code.  11 U.S.C. § 548 (1993).  In addition, the estate representative succeeds to the
status of any creditor who held a fraudulent transfer action as of the filing of the bankruptcy
case.  11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1993).
21. Frankel, supra note 1, at 488.
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II.  ARE LAWYERS THE INNOVATORS
AND HARMONIZERS?
I also question whether lawyers innovate and standardize to the
extent assumed by Professor Frankel.  From my perspective, that
function is being served by rating agencies such as Standard and
Poor’s, Moody’s Investor Service, and Fitch.  One need only visit the
websites of these entities to see that they publish tremendous
amounts of information on how to standardize deals.22  And with good
reason: each of these agencies in turn issue ratings from which the
parties then price their deals.  As a consequence, one sees informa-
tion on how different industries produce different deals,23 how the
domestic laws of various countries are or are not accommodated,24
and even what the rating agency looks for in legal opinions.25  My
sense is that this is also an engine of standardization and perhaps the
primary one.26  When a market looks to relatively few players, such as
rating agencies, for an essential component of a transaction (i.e., a
rating), it is those agencies which take it upon themselves to stan-
dardize and to make efficient the transactions, since they have the
most to gain, over time, from standardized transactions.
The relative status of lawyers and rating agencies can be seen
from requirements that rating agencies impose upon securitization
participants.  These include extensive lists that detail those things
upon which  lawyers are required  to opine.27  I agree with Professor
Frankel that the limitations on such opinions, such as liability for an
incorrect opinion, in turn restrict the securitization structure, and
22. For Moody’s Investor Service, see http://www.moodys.com/cust/default.asp; for Stan-
dard & Poor’s, see http://www.standardandpoors.com/; for Fitch ICBA Duff & Phelps, see
http://www.fitchratings.com/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2002).
23. A good example is Fitch’s research page on the web.  See http://www.fitchratings.com/
corporate/sectors/criteria_rpt.cfm?sector_flag=1&marketsector=2&detail= (last visited Feb. 26,
2002).
24. See, e.g., MOODY’S INVESTOR SERVICE, BANKRUPTCY & RATINGS: A LEVERAGED
FINANCE APPROACH FOR EUROPE, PART IV: ITALY (May 2001), available at http://www.
moodys.com/moodys/cust/research/venus/Publication/Special%20Comment/noncategorized_nu
mber/67414.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2002).  Part I deals with Europe generally; Part II deals
with France; Part III deals with Germany.
25. See, e.g., MOODY’S INVESTMENT SERVICE, MOODY’S APPROACH TO ANALYZING
LEGAL OPINIONS IN RATING FULLY SUPPORTED DEBT (Mar. 19, 1999), available at http://
www.moodys.com/moodys/cust/research/avalon/Publication/Rating%20Methodology/noncatego
rized_number/SF7356.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2002).
26. Especially since each of the rating agencies publish on their web sites many documents
on the necessary criteria for obtaining a rating.  See supra notes 22–25.
27. See, e.g., MOODY’S INVESTMENT SERVICE, MOODY’S APPROACH TO ANALYZING
LEGAL OPINIONS IN RATING FULLY SUPPORTED DEBT, supra note 25.
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promote standardization and efficiency.  But, note who is asking for
these opinions, not the parties, but an outside stranger to the con-
tracts.
Transactions are done because they make money for the partici-
pants.  That money is made only if the transaction closes as so de-
vised.  The transaction closes only if a suitable rating, or a price that
reflects the risk of not obtaining a rating, is obtained.  A suitable rat-
ing is obtained only if the deal comports with a structure that the rat-
ing agency has blessed, or can be convinced presents the same risk as
existing transactions.  The structures that have evolved, in turn, pay
close attention to the pronouncements and words of statutes and
judges.  That a lawyer or an academic can connect a particular deal’s
structure to those words is not the same thing as saying that the words
of law are surplusage; one can envision securitization without lawyers
or academics, but not without courts or legislators.
III.  IS THE VIEW THAT LAWYERS MAKE LAW OR
LAW-LIKE RULES UNDEMOCRATIC?
There is another deeper objection.  One hallmark of modern le-
gal theory is that somehow the consent of the governed is sought, ei-
ther by the text of the law itself, as in a public initiative, or to the pro-
cess by which the law was adopted, the more normal legislative
method.28  Unless one adopts the estoppel theory of Professor
Frankel,29 her vision of lex Juris is notably lacking on this point.  In-
deed, lawyers, the source of lex Juris, are bound not to society but to
the selfish interests of their clients.  If a benefit of a particular deal
structure comes at some cost to a non-party, and the non-party has no
recourse under other law, then the lawyer is bound to achieve the
benefit for her client, despite the consequences to third parties.30
To institutionalize the marginalization of third parties, as a full
theory of lex Juris would seem to do, appears to me to be the wrong
way to go.  And, its efficaciousness is belied by the actions of lawyers
in the United States.  If their opinions held the force of law, then
pending legislation to change the U.S. Bankruptcy Code would not be
necessary.  This legislation, particularly Section 912 of the Bank-
28. See supra notes 7, 8.
29. See supra note 9, for my discussion of Professor Frankel’s estoppel theory.
30. There are examples of the political process trying to limit these types of impositions.
One example might be the federal Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act
(WARN Act), 102 Stat. 890, 29 U.S.C. § 2101 et seq. (1988), which obligates a business to notify
local entities before closing certain plants or facilities.  Id. § 2102.
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ruptcy Reform Act of 2001, would codify a large chunk of current se-
curitization practice.31  It would provide that no asset securitized in a
transaction in which at least one tranche was rated investment grade
could ever become subject to a bankruptcy filed by the transferor of
that asset.  This provision has drawn fire for being insufficiently pro-
tective of third party rights,32 but even so, if lex Juris has the status
claimed, one wonders why it should even be necessary.
IV.  CONCLUSION
The concept of lex Juris is subtly seductive.  It leads us to view
the work of lawyers in cross-border securitization as the work of pub-
lic servants making everyone’s lot in life better.  While lawyers are
important in the global legal system, I do not think that they neces-
sarily serve that function.  Rather, lawyers serve to articulate the
needs and desires of their clients and strive to create crucibles in
which those needs and desires can be combined with the lawyer’s
knowledge of the relevant law.  That such crucibles are becoming
standardized is a proposition with which I can easily agree.  To say
that it is lex Juris that is creating that standardization is, I think, con-
flating the crucible with its contents.
31. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, H.R. 333, 107th Cong. § 912 (2001).  This legislation is
expected to be reintroduced in the second session of the 107th Congress.
32. I have reported on the opposition of the National Bankruptcy Conference and the Na-
tional Association of Credit Managers.  Bruce A. Markell, What If Bankruptcy Reform Is Not
Dead? Securitization Exclusions Could Pose Problems, B.C.D. NEWS AND COMMENT, Oct. 10,
2001.
